Godzilla

A fast, multi-language Static Application Security Testing (SAST) analyzer for CI/CD gates.

Godzilla lowers source code from several languages into one language-neutral SSA intermediate representation — gIR — and runs a single inter-procedural taint engine over it. Every language funnels into the same IR, so you write a detection rule once and it applies across every supported language.

flowchart LR
    GO[Go] --> FE
    PY[Python] --> FE
    JS[JavaScript] --> FE
    JV[Java] --> FE
    RS[Rust] --> FE
    RB[Ruby] --> FE
    CC["C / C++"] --> FE

    FE["Language<br/>frontends"] --> IR["gIR<br/>language-neutral SSA"]
    IR --> ENG["Taint engine<br/>+ YAML rules"]
    ENG --> FD["Findings<br/>with confidence"]
    FD --> OUT["Report · JSON · SARIF<br/>severity-gated exit code"]
    FD -. optional .-> LLM["LLM review"]
    LLM -.-> OUT

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_{All seven languages lower to the same gIR; a single engine and rule set run over it.}

Status: usable and tested, but young. See Status & limitations.

Features

• Multi-language, one engine. Go, Python, JavaScript, Java, Rust, and Ruby (plus C/C++ in an opt-in cgo build) all emit the same gIR; the taint engine and rules are language-agnostic.
• Inter-procedural taint tracking. Follows untrusted data across function calls (source → sanitizer → sink). Each finding carries a confidence — High for intra-procedural, Medium for cross-function.
• YAML rules, sink-argument aware. Sources / sinks / sanitizers / propagators are canonical-name globs. A sink can pin its injection-point argument ("go:*database/sql*.Query#0"), so a parameterized db.Query("... = ?", x) is not a false positive. See docs/writing-rules.md.
• Batteries included. Built-in packs for SQL injection, command injection, path traversal, SSRF, XSS, open redirect, insecure deserialization, and code injection, plus non-dataflow checks for weak crypto and hardcoded secrets.
• CI-friendly output. Human-readable findings, a self-contained HTML report, JSON and SARIF 2.1.0 (for GitHub code scanning), and a severity-gated exit code.
• Optional LLM review. A pluggable stage sends low-confidence findings to Claude to trim false positives; it fails open and is off by default.
• Single self-contained binary. Go/JS/Ruby-parsing is pure Go; Python, Java, and Rust shell out to a toolchain on PATH and degrade gracefully when absent.

Install

go install godzilla/cmd/godzilla@latest    # or, from a clone:
go build -o godzilla ./cmd/godzilla

Requires Go 1.25+. Scanning Python, Ruby, Java, or Rust also needs that language's toolchain (python3, ruby, a JDK 24+ java, rustc) on PATH; each degrades gracefully when absent. Or skip install entirely and run with Docker.

Quick start

# Scan a directory (or a single source file) with the built-in rules
godzilla scan ./path/to/project

# Write an HTML report and fail the build only on high+ severity
godzilla scan --html report.html --fail-on high ./path/to/project

# Machine-readable output: JSON for tooling, SARIF for GitHub code scanning
godzilla scan --sarif results.sarif --json results.json ./path/to/project

# Add your own rules on top of the built-ins, and print the gIR summary
godzilla scan --rules myrules.yaml --summary ./path/to/project

# Triage lower-confidence findings with an LLM (needs ANTHROPIC_API_KEY)
godzilla scan --llm-review ./path/to/project

# Changed-files mode: gate only what a commit touched (one process, one gate)
git diff --name-only --cached | godzilla scan -files -

Pre-commit hook (.git/hooks/pre-commit) — gate a commit on only its staged files, so a docs-only commit passes cleanly:

#!/bin/sh
git diff --name-only --cached --diff-filter=d | godzilla scan -files - --fail-on high

Exit codes: 0 clean · 1 error · 2 bad usage · 3 findings at/above --fail-on (default: medium). Use the exit code as your CI gate.

$ godzilla scan ./test/go/sql_injection
[high] go-sql-injection (CWE-89, confidence: high)
  Untrusted input flows into a database/sql query without parameterized arguments...
  sink:   .../main.go:62:24  ->  go:(*database/sql.DB).Query
  source: .../main.go:59:26
  in:     go:.../sql_injection.main$1
1 finding(s); 1 at/above "medium".

Run with Docker

Prebuilt images ship with the toolchains a scan needs, so you can gate a repo without installing anything. They live on GHCR in two variants:

Image	Size	Scans
ghcr.io/bytevet/godzilla (:latest)	~600–700 MB	Go · JavaScript/TS · Python · Ruby · secrets
ghcr.io/bytevet/godzilla:full	~1.5–2 GB	everything in slim + Java + Rust

The entrypoint is godzilla and the default command is scan ., so mounting a repo at /src scans it immediately:

# Scan the current directory (exit 3 on a finding at/above --fail-on)
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/src" ghcr.io/bytevet/godzilla

# Any arguments override the default `scan .`
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/src" ghcr.io/bytevet/godzilla \
  scan --sarif /src/results.sarif --fail-on high /src

# Java/Rust need the full image
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/src" ghcr.io/bytevet/godzilla:full

The slim image skips Java and Rust with a coverage warning rather than failing. Tags: X.Y.Z/X.Y/latest (slim) and X.Y.Z-full/full (full) track releases; edge/edge-full track main. Images are multi-arch (amd64 + arm64).

Supported languages & detections

	Go	Python	JavaScript	Java	Rust	Ruby
Parser	golang.org/x/tools SSA	python3 ast	goja (pure Go); TS/JSX/ESM via esbuild	JVM bytecode (java.lang.classfile)	rustc MIR	ruby Ripper
SQL injection	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅
Command injection	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅
Path traversal	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅	—
SSRF	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅	—
Reflected XSS	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅	—
Open redirect	✅	✅	✅	✅	✅	—
Insecure deserialization	—	✅	—	✅	—	—
Code injection (eval)	—	✅	✅	—	—	—
Weak crypto	✅	—	—	✅	—	—

Hardcoded secrets (CWE-798) are detected in all languages by a regex scan over gIR string constants, independent of the taint engine.

• Java analyzes JVM bytecode (so it scans .class/.jar too); needs a JDK 24+ java on PATH. Maven/Gradle projects are built first so third-party deps are on the classpath.
• Rust analyzes rustc MIR and ships in the default binary — only rustc is needed. A Cargo.toml project is built so web-framework request accessors are recognized as sources.
• C / C++ are analyzed via LLVM IR — an opt-in cgo build (make build-llvm, needs libLLVM + clang), not in the default binary. Adds command injection, path traversal, format string, SQL injection, and buffer-overflow checks.

Full frontend details are in ARCHITECTURE.md.

Writing rules

A rule is a source→sink taint spec (or a non-dataflow dangerous-call check) matched against canonical <lang>:module.Type.member names. Adding a detection is usually a few lines of YAML in rulepacks/; pass your own with --rules. See the rule-authoring guide.

How it works

• gIR (proto/ → pkg/ir/v1/) is a small language-neutral SSA core plus an INTRINSIC escape hatch, with stable canonical names so rules join across languages.
• Frontends (converters/*) lower each language to gIR.
• Analysis (internal/analysis/) builds a call graph and runs inter-procedural taint, plus the secrets scan.
• Rules, report, LLM reviewer, and the CLI sit on top.

flowchart TD
    CLI["cmd/godzilla<br/>scan CLI · exit code"] --> CONV["converters/*<br/>frontends → gIR"]
    CONV --> IRp["pkg/ir/v1<br/>gIR (generated from proto/)"]
    IRp --> AN["internal/analysis<br/>call graph · taint · secrets"]
    RULES["internal/rules<br/>YAML rule packs"] --> AN
    AN --> REP["internal/report<br/>HTML · JSON · SARIF"]
    AN --> REV["internal/llm<br/>optional review"]
    REV --> REP

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See ARCHITECTURE.md for the full design and rationale.

Status & limitations

Godzilla is functional and covered by tests, but deliberately scoped:

• Python/JS lowering is straight-line — control flow is flattened into one conceptual pass. Taint still flows through the common expression forms and class-based handlers; the main gap is taint carried across methods via instance attributes (self.attr / this.attr).
• Taint is inter-procedural but context-insensitive. Interface/dynamic dispatch is threaded via class-hierarchy analysis (an over-approximation).
• SSRF is host-aware — a finding is suppressed when the taint only reaches the path/query of a proven fixed host, conservatively (never a false negative).
• Pointer analysis is approximated (value-flow + CHA), not full points-to.

See the implementation status for the per-component detail.

Contributing

Contributions welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md. Good first areas: new built-in rules (often just YAML — guide), a new language frontend, or improving frontend fidelity.

License

MIT © 2026 SYM01